Aristotle is the first logician who has introduced a “quantifier for predicate” and assessed the truth and falsity of PROPOSITIONS with a quantifier in their predicates. Avicenna has referred to these PROPOSITIONS as ‘deviated PROPOSITIONS’, explaining the laws of contradiction among them. He has, however, not mentioned any other RULES that govern deviated PROPOSITIONS. Deviated PROPOSITIONS are divided into two groups; those that are parallel to one of the Aristotelian quarter quantifieds and those that are not as such. Combined together, these two groups constitute eight quantifieds. The relation among then can be illustrated through ‘a cube of opposition’. By formulating these eight quantifieds in modern logic, one can easily show that all these quantifieds have even conversions. This article shows that the RULES of the Four Figures for these quantifieds are the same as the ‘RULES of expansion of syllogism’. There is no need for a particular set of laws for every figure, though it is possible to relate for every figure its related RULES.

Content interpretation is a cognitive ability which is mostly concerned with understanding the intention of the person who has created or narrated the content. Narrator is also important since his/ her specific intention, which is inevitable in media like a social network, may change the reality of a created content. Here, the focal point is a sort of transformation with the aim of yielding the class of a message behind the content. In this paper, we propose a rule-based framework for interpreting contents in a social network that has the ability to perform such a transformation through using some generic RULES with PROPOSITIONS at high abstraction level. The reason for selecting abstract PROPOSITIONS is their ability in covering wide range of facts occurring in the real world situation. Our suggested framework is in reality able to determine the class of a message indicating the possible intention of either a content’s creator or its narrator, such as whether a narrator is seeking honesty/justice toward the others, is after respect for the people, cares for compassion/ mercy, emphasizes a significance of knowing/ thinking in life, or is after self-upgradation to conduct a healthy life. These classes of message are determined according to both philosophical and psychological aspects which do exist behind the cognitive, emotional and ethical faculties in human being. Results of some experiments show that the generic RULES proposed in this paper, which are structured on the ground of abstract PROPOSITIONS, have enough ability to respond successfully to the issue of interpretation in a social network with the characteristics already mentioned. Also, these results approve the fact that such an abstraction is able enough to handle the possible facts hidden in the contents showing up in social network.

One of the popular theories of rationality of science is rationality as foundationism according to which rationality of a scientific theory is based on sense data upon which the theory has been constructed. The issue of certain data is, however, followed by many debates. In the present article, appealing to Wittgenstein ideas about "certainty", authors present a new understanding of certainties in a scientific theory. According to this new understanding, each and every scientific theory consists of two kinds of PROPOSITIONS: fixed and fluid. Based on this classification of PROPOSITIONS of a scientific theory, a new idea is presented concerning rationality of scientific theories according to which a theory is rational if, firstly it is consistent and, second, it retains fixed PROPOSITIONS of the scientific society and replaces fluid PROPOSITIONS by other proper ones.Presenting historical evidence, the authors try to show that this idea is efficient and realistic if it is assessed according to standards of rationality which are based on evidency of sense data.

The most important topic in logic is deduction which is treated in logical books under the heading of argument. Ancients divided argument into the three classes of syllogism, induction and analogy.As to kinds of and the sort of division of argument some questions has been raised. On the one hand, besides the theory of syllogism which is without doubt Aristotle's masterpiece one of important works of Aristotle's in the field of logic is the topic of "conversion", "contradiction" and "contrast".Of course, in Organon these topics have been treated incidentally. Ibn Sina added some relations to those which Aristotle had introduced and by finding the similarity of these topics brought them together in his logical works.After Ibn sina, logicians by following him introduced these relations under the heading "representative argument". The same topic has been treated in recent books of traditional logic with the title "RULES of proposition". This title suggests that these logicians regard "RULES of proposition" as a kind of deduction and argument.In this article the author defends the latter view and by assuming the conversion to be a kind of argument and examples like that has proposed a division of deduction in which the place of these arguments has been clearly defined and has no difficulties of previous division.

This research tries to present a model so that the reader of Sufi texts can recognize the three types of knowledge in the written heritage of Sufism and find out the relationship between the original and the sub and the text and the margin in the teachings of the Sufis. For this purpose, the mystical experience (discovery and intuition) of the mystic as the original center of knowledge and the source of the perception of the sublime is the criterion of the mysticism of the speech, and the level of mysticism is measured based on the ratio of Sufi PROPOSITIONS to this center of knowledge, and based on this criterion, the collection of words He classifies Sufism into three types: experimental speech, theoretical speech, and organizational speech. The article further explores the roles of language and metaphor in each of these three types of speech and shows that the exploratory, personal and artistic roles of language in experimental speech are more than the other two types of speech and the mysticism of speech in the creative and innovative field of language Appears.

Muslim philosophers have divided conceptual knowledge into two distinct categories: self- evident and non self - evident.The latter is proved by the former. But Muslim thinkers in justifying the self-evident PROPOSITIONS have different logical and analytical approaches. This paper deals with these approaches and attempts to show the place of self-evident PROPOSITIONS in the structure of deductive sciences.

There are two general methods for interpreting and analyzing khārijī and ḥaqīqī PROPOSITIONS: first, by analyzing them within a unified logic; second, by assigning separate logics to khārijī and ḥaqīqī PROPOSITIONS. So far, most interpretations and analyses of khārijī and ḥaqīqī PROPOSITIONS have been carried out using the first method within either traditional logic or a branch of modern logic, while the second method has rarely been used for this purpose. In this article, we aim to use the second method and demonstrate that the appropriate logic for ḥaqīqī PROPOSITIONS is classical predicate logic, while for khārijī PROPOSITIONS, it is predicate-free logic. We show that non-classical predicate-free logic restricts the RULES of introduction and elimination of the quantifiers on the existence of khārijī objects, making it the most suitable logic for khārijī PROPOSITIONS. In contrast, classical predicate logic, which does not restrict the quantifiers on the external existence of objects, is more suitable for ḥaqīqī PROPOSITIONS. Additionally, we illustrate that by incorporating modal logic and temporal logic into classical and free predicate logics, the principles and RULES of ḥaqīqī and khārijī PROPOSITIONS become more distinguishable, resulting in more distinct logics. In particular, we demonstrate that the Barcan Formula, the Buridan Formula, and the converse Barcan Formula hold true for ḥaqīqī PROPOSITIONS and are proven in classical modal and temporal logics, while they are false for khārijī PROPOSITIONS and remain unprovable in free modal and temporal logic.